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Abstract
Conventional economic thinking says corruption and income inequality are positively related. 
In contrast, this study finds that lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality. 
The finding of a trade-off is not unexpected in the context of Latin America, for two reasons. 
First, Latin America has a large informal sector and corruption-reducing polices impose a 
transaction cost on this sector whose members are among the poorest. Second, redistributive 
measures, promoted by corrupt elements in society, are often cut back with institutional 
reform and this serves to worsen inequality. The results imply that corruption-reducing 
policies aimed at lowering inequality may be misguided.        
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11. Introduction 
Conventional  economic  thinking  says  that  lower  corruption  reduces  income  inequality 
through  various  channels  (e.g.,  Gupta  et  al,  2002;  Gyimah-Brempong,  2002;  Gyimah-
Brempong and Muñoz de Camacho, 2006). However, Chong and Calderon (2000) find a non-
monotonic relationship between corruption and inequality in a cross sectional study of many 
countries and conclude that the presence of a large informal sector may be the reason why the 
expected relationship does not hold for some countries. One way to explore this further is to 
study corruption and inequality for a group of countries that have a sizeable informal sector 
and  where  there  is  a  focus  on  institutional  reform.  Latin  America  seems  a  good  choice 
because the informal sector plays a significant role in most labour markets, contributing 25-
35%  of  aggregate  output.  Also,  in  recent  times  many  countries  have  been  introducing 
corruption-reducing policies and other institutional reforms
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This  paper  examines  the  corruption-inequality  relationship  in  Latin  America.  The 
novel feature of the paper is the finding of robust evidence of a trade-off between corruption 
and inequality. This result is important not only because it is consistent with the idea that the 
corruption-inequality relationship may be different where there is a large informal sector but 
also because it suggests policy reform measures in Latin America may be misguided. The rest 
of the paper  is  structured  as  follows. Section  2  describes  the empirical methodology and 
Section 3 reports the results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Econometric investigation 
Econometric estimation is conducted using four-year panel data over the period 1984-2003 
for  19  Latin  American  countries.
2  The  empirical  specification  in  (1)  is  similar  to  that  in 
previous empirical research (e.g. Barro, 2000; Lundberg and Squire, 2003): 
2  ! ! it it i it I X A " #           (i 1,....n;t 1,......T )      (1) 
where I is a measure of income inequality for country i at time t. Xit is a vector of explanatory 
variables  that  vary  across  time  and  countries.  The  parameter  Ai  contains  a  constant  and 
individual-specific variables that are invariant over time and  it is the classical error term.   
The  dependent  variable  is  the  Gini  coefficient.  Inequality  data  is  drawn  from  the 
United Nations World Income Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER, 2005).
3 We use 
dummy variables to control for the definition of income and the survey unit. The measure of 
corruption is the widely used International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index. The 
ICRG measure takes values from zero (most corrupt) to six (least corrupt).
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As in other studies of inequality (e.g., Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998; Morley, 
2000; Gupta et al, 2002; Reuveny and Li, 2003; Albanesi, 2007) the model also includes the 
following explanatory variables: real output per capita (lgdp), real output per capita squared 
(lgdp
2), primary (primary) and secondary (secondary) gross school enrolment rates, the share 
of agriculture in total output (aggdp), the ratio of broad money to output (m2gdp), domestic 
credit to the private sector (dcps), the distribution of land resources (land), openness of the 
economy (trade), foreign direct investment (fdi), inflation (inflation), the concentration of 
natural resources (natres), privatisation (priv) and interaction terms. Data for these variables 
is taken from the Penn World Tables, Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002), World 
Bank World Development Indicators (2003) and Frankema (2005). 
To deal with potential endogeneity an instrumental variable (IV) methodology is used. 
In  other  research  several  instruments  for  corruption  have  been  used  (e.g.,  Gupta,  2002; 
Gyimah-Brempong and Muñoz de Camacho, 2006). In the case of Latin America there is a 
limited availability of suitable instruments, which restricts our choice to two: democracy and 
government consumption. Tests are undertaken to ensure that the instruments are valid and 
3relevant. Panel based tests for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are also conducted 
(Woolridge, 2002).  
3. Results 
The results of estimating (1) using OLS are shown in Table 1. Several different specifications 
are shown in columns (1) to (4). The random effects model is rejected in favour of the fixed 
effects model. The sign on the corruption coefficient (corrupt) is positive in column (1). The 
higher is the corruption index (lower is corruption), the higher is inequality. The positive sign 
persists for alternative model specifications as indicated in the other columns of Table 1. This 
result indicates there is a trade-off between inequality and corruption.
Table 2 reports results using an alternative dependent variable, the share of income in 
the lowest quintile. The results show that as corruption falls the percentage of people in the 
lowest  income  group  rises  (inequality  worsens).  This  result  persists  over  alternative 
specifications. Table 3 shows the results for the IV estimation.
5 The corruption index is again 
positive. Based on the F-1st statistic and the test for overidentifying restrictions, we conclude 
that the instruments are relevant and valid. The finding of a trade-off between inequality and 
corruption appears to be robust.
The finding of a trade-off can be explained as follows. Institutional reform is likely to 
exacerbate inequality in countries where there is a large informal sector. Firms in this sector 
have low operating costs arising from their lack of compliance to rules and regulations. It is 
for  this  reason  that  the  sector  tends  to  employ  the  poorest  members  of  society.  Since 
compliance  comes  with  institutional  reform  and  corruption  reducing  measures,  firms  will 
incur rising costs. Furthermore, the actual process of reform requires better trained personnel 
and support infrastructure, necessitating new taxes. Higher costs of production, new taxes and 
more vigilant policing will have a direct impact on employment in the informal sector.
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A second plausible explanation for the trade-off focuses on the impact of reform on 
redistributive  measures.  In  many  developing  countries  income  redistribution  policies  are 
promoted  by  corrupt  elements  in  society  whose  primary  interest  is  political  power.
7  For 
example, “special government projects” designed to increase employment of the poor are 
promoted by particular groups who can benefit from such projects (e.g., construction of roads 
and  housing  development  schemes).  These  projects  employ  manual  labourers  who  would 
otherwise have been unemployed. As countries introduce institutional reform, rent seeking is 
reduced since “special government projects” are more stringently assessed and the tendering 
process  becomes  more  competitive.  Projects  which  would  have  been  undertaken  under  a 
corrupt system are not undertaken now because they are not economically viable. Further, 
contracts which are in operation may be stopped or not renewed. It is also likely that projects 
are more capital intensive.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper finds evidence of a trade-off between income inequality and corruption using 
panel data for Latin America. The result is robust to different measures of inequality and 
different model specifications and estimation methods. Our key finding is consistent with the 
idea  that  the  corruption-inequality  relationship  may  be  different  where  there  is  a  large 
informal  sector,  as  in  Latin  America.  As  governments  implement  institutional  reform,  a 
transaction cost is imposed on the informal sector whose members are among the poorest in 
society. Reform also involves a cutting back on redistributive measures, promoted by corrupt 
elements, and this serves to worsen inequality. The finding of a trade-off between inequality 
and corruption is also consistent with work that has examined the impact of institutional 
reform, such as trade and financial reforms, on inequality in the region.  Referencesrom History Growth, Distribution and 
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7Table 1: OLS estimation results (Gini index) 
Dependent variable: Gini index  (1) (2) (3) (4)
lgdp -100.812  -39.460  -97.718  -5.094
[0.254]  [0.581]  [0.157]  [0.148] 
lgdp
2 5.419  1.853  5.377 
[0.283]  [0.639]  [0.165] 
primary  -0.1136**  -0.137**  -0.133**  -0.133** 
[0.040]  [0.051]  [0.055]  [0.048] 
secondary  0.123**  0.087*  0.081*  0.099* 
[0.024]  [0.091]  [0.092]  [0.074] 
aggdp -0.111
[0.4145] 
m2gdp   0.195**  0.136** 
[0.030]  [0.0461] 
dcps 0.086**  0.091** 
[0.027]  [0.044] 
trade 0.166***  0.123**  0.224***  0.167*** 
[0.000]  [0.024]  [0.000]  [0.003] 
inflation 0.000 
[0.603] 
natres 0.262  0.118 
[0.235]  [0.372] 
land 36.049**  31.655  31.361* 
[0.035]  [0.223]  [0.077] 
corrupt 1.566**  1.424**  2.530**  1.831*** 
[0.024]  [0.026]  [0.051]  [0.007] 








priv 0.180  0.705* 
[0.222]  [0.090] 
constant 479.160  246.166  465.830  53.807 
[0.214]  [0.443]  [0.110]  [0.1794] 
F- test  23.3657  24.1032  23.3657  21.895 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  15.803  24.167  24.198  16.901 
(p-value) (0.0453)  (0.0437)  (0.0040)  [0.034] 
Adjusted R
2 0.527  0.548  0.563  0.537 
Number of observations  70 73 70 66
p-values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Fixed effects not reported 
8Table 2: OLS estimation results (% share in lowest quintile) 
Dependent variable: percentage 
share of population in lowest 
quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lgdp -28.476  14.740  0.506  -21.941 
[0.551]  [0.754]  [0.668]  [0.601] 
lgdp
2 1.500  -1.260 1.123 
[0.584]  [0.644]  [0.661] 
primary  -0.225**  -0.184*  -0.193**  -0.215** 
[0.013]  [0.076]  [0.0377]  [0.041] 
secondary  0.146**  0.109*  0.142* 
[0.049]  [0.091]  [0.070] 
aggdp -0.471
[0.128] 
M2gdp   0.119**  0.106* 
[0.051]  [0.067] 
dcps 0.124***  0.121*** 
[0.003]  [0.003] 
trade 0.080**  0.045  0.075* 
[0.024]  [0.556]  [0.091] 
inflation 0.000  0.000 
[0.296]  [0.791] 
natres 0.291**  0.361  0.663*** 
[0.045]  [0.267]  [0.005] 
land 43.9071  67.931*** 
[0.162]  [0.001] 
corrupt 1.602**  1.465**  1.577**  1.753** 





corrupt*priv  0.118 
[0.481] 
fdi 0.144*  0.376** 
[0.053]  [0.041] 
priv 0.269*  0.344**  0.446*** 
[0.061]  [0.043]  [0.003] 
constant 80.994  56.818  46.887  135.33 
[0.711]  [0.541]  [0.751]  [0.524] 
F- test  15.321  21.71  23.16  19.013 
(p-value) [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Hausman test  23.470  33.481  19.131  24.940 
(p-value) [0.003]  [0.001]  [0.021  [0.000] 
Adjusted R
2 0.631  0.663  0.624  0.668 
Number of observations  61 57 58 59
p-values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Fixed effects not reported 
9Table 3: IV estimation results 
Dependent variable: Gini index Gini index  % of  pop in 
lowest quintile 
% of  pop in 
lowest quintile 
lgdp -170.542  -93.279  -166.918  -78.856 
[0.2526]  [0.376]  [0.341]  [0.545] 
lgdp
2 9.394  5.210  9.464  4.465 
[0.171]  [0.881]  [0.391]  [0.553] 
primary  -0.175**  -0.160*  -0.218***  -0.183** 
[0.045]  [0.08]  [0.009]  [0.041] 
secondary  0.164**  0.113*  0.2583*** 
[0.015]  [0.095]  [0.001] 
aggdp -0.042 -0.287
[0.868]  [0.357] 
M2gdp  0.144*  0.147* 
[0.091]  [0.098] 
land 43.318**  27.433 
[0.026]  [0.138] 
corrupt 3.837**  3.168*  4.254**  4.464** 
[0.050]  [0.063]  [0.045]  [0.047] 
dcps 0.0807**  0.078** 
[0.049]  [0.055] 
trade 0.145***  0.134***  0.055** 
[0.000]  [0.003]  [0.078] 
inflation -0.000 -0.001
[0.3410]  [0.648] 
natres 0.2938  0.487***  0.813** 
[0.154]  [0.000]  [0.039] 
land 27.433 
[0.134] 
fdi -0.017 0.0274 
[0.883]  [0.812] 
priv -0.081 0.482 
[0.654]  [0.112] 
constant 773.542  442.283  775.09  388.246 
[0.159]  [0.344]  [0.3410]  [0.483] 
F-1st F-statistic 13.139  9.551  14.623  8.55
Test for overidentifiying  
restrictions
0.353  2.33 0.652  3.541 
Adjusted R
2 0.529  0.545  0.614  0.621 
Number of observations  68 62 61 58
p-values are in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Fixed effects not reported 
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Notes
 
1 This set of reforms is collectively known in Latin America as “second generation reforms”. Policy also reflects 
to  a  lesser  extent  public  concern  over  corruption  and  income  inequality  (Latinobarometro,  2003;  see 
http://www.latinobarometro.org).  
2 Countries included in the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
3 Available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
4 This measure has been criticised by Lambsdorff (2006) on the grounds that the index measures the political risk 
of corruption. The problem with using an alternative measure, such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), is 
data is not available for the entire study period. We did experiment with the CPI for a sub period where data is 
available (1997-2003). The sign of the corruption variable (cpi) is positive (and near to being significant).  
Gini = 28.321 + 9.417lgdp - 0.460lgdp
2 - 0.109primary + 0.840cpi + 0.815natres + 0.073fdi
                        (0.963)     (0.754)         (0.745)          (0.034)              (0.120)      (0.002)            (0.003)       
- 0.066trade  - 0.193priv - 21.037land
     (0.280)           (0.132)         (0.3317) 
  R
2 = 0.537  Hausman = 18.756 (0.027)    F-test = 17.407 (0.0000)  n = 51 
p-values are in parentheses 
5 Dynamic panel estimation would be an ideal procedure to adopt given the limited choice of instrumental 
variables. However, missing observations and the fact that the Arellano-Bond method involves differencing the 
variables and using lags as instruments, would leave us with too few observations. 
6 Using cross section data, Chong and Calderon (2000) find a non-monotonic relationship between institutional 
quality and inequality. They allude to the presence of a political Kuznets curve. We tried a squared term for the 
corruption variable but it was not significant.     
7 Support for this view can be found in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) who state that corruption helps to promote 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/'￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿ *￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿4￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿*￿+￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿9￿￿ *￿4￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿





￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6￿￿￿￿￿<￿+￿￿ ￿4￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,￿=￿￿￿&￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿4￿￿)/￿￿. ￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿)￿￿








￿￿￿3￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ *￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿;<<=￿;<>?￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿￿%￿ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ,￿=￿￿￿ )￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿ 7￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿8￿ -￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ "￿0￿2￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿ %￿￿￿)￿
￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿44￿￿C￿%￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿4/￿￿￿￿#4￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/'￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿'￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿+￿￿￿#￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿+￿￿￿#￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿/%￿!￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/'￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4+￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/'￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿)￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿￿%￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿=￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿)￿-￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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